

## The role of *Muhtasib* in the control of grains trade in Sokoto metropolis 1812-1903

Murtala Ahmed Rufa'i

Department of History, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, Nigeria

### Abstract

One of the immediate measures taken by the Sokoto Jihad leaders after the wars that led to the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate was how to ensure abundant food supply to the vanguards of the revolution. Food question was so critical during the formative period of the Jihad and its supply required urgent attention, or else the will and zeal of the Jama'a, (supporters of the Jihad movement) would be weakened. The insecurity created by the war crippled grains supply. Also, the ruling class deliberately imposed the policy of interdiction so as to cut-off grains supply to the Jihadists. This 'food-war' had threatened the philosophical foundation of the Caliphate in its early days 1804-1812. To break this bound and ensure enough food supply the office of the *Muhtasib* was established and given to Muhammadu Julde in 1812. The role of the *Muhtasib* in the control of grains trade was rarely mentioned in most of the literatures. The main duty of *Muhtasib* in this respect was to regulate and control the illegal activities perpetuated by grains traders, such as grains hoarding, adulteration and the use of sub- standard measures within and outside the markets among several others. This paper attempts to study the role of *Muhtasib* in the control of grains trade in metropolitan Sokoto.

**Keywords:** Muhtasib, Sokoto Jihad, Islamic State Control and Grains Trade

### Introduction

Islamic economic system has provided comprehensive rules governing the conduct of trade. This shows the importance of trade in Islam, which is often considered by the religion as a noble means of earning legitimate income. Islam also clearly spelt out the category of people who should participate in any form of trade. It further, provides regulatory institutions that would ensure such traders abide-by the regulations and conditions of the trade. This was all with the view to protect consumer rights as enshrined in the Islamic law. Although the religion supported open economy, but it spelt out measures to guide against undue- monopoly and exploitation of consumers by the market forces in a free market economy.

In fact, the establishment of commercial law, encouraging of profit, the prohibition of fraud and the call for the establishment of clear standard of weights and measures, pushed Islamic economic system forward, over and above other economic systems. Islam mandated the Caliph (Leader) to cater for the social, economic and religious needs of the entire citizenry, because of the numerous demands of the society. The Caliph could also delegate responsibilities to individuals who could manage and control certain offices. This was what led to the emergence of the institution of *Muhtasib*. The rationales behind the creation of this office in Islam were numerous but summarised under the logic of commanding good and forbidding evils. Part of this broad objective is the issue of regulation and control of all commercial and economic transactions.

In the light of this, the paper discussed the role of this institution in the control of grains trade in metropolitan Sokoto from 1812 when the institution was founded to the British conquest of the area in 1903. The paper is divided into five sections, the first section constitutes the abstract and introduction, section two looks at location of the study

area and grains trade during the Jihad, section three constitutes the establishment of the institution of *Muhtasib*, section four, explains the role of the institution in the control of grains trade, while the last section is conclusion.

### Brief History of Sokoto Metropolis

The Jihad movement led by Shiekh Usmanu Danfodiyo was a major event that changed the course of human history in Hausaland in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Abba, 1979) <sup>[1]</sup>. The event affected an area of over 250,000 square miles in the territories of Kebbi, Zamfara Gobir and beyond. The Jihad led to the establishment of new Islamic state called the Sokoto Caliphate in the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Adeleye, 1971) <sup>[7]</sup>. This new Islamic polity was established in the territory of Gobir, with its new capital at (Sakkwato) Sokoto in 1809 (Isah, 2013). The area had been used as early as October 1804 by the Shiekh Usman Danfodiyo as the venue for the meeting with Galadima, Yunfa's Vizier, (Last, 1966) <sup>[25]</sup>. It was also used by Shiekh Muhammadu Bello the son of Shehu another leader of the Jihad as a staging post for an attack on Dufua in the spring of 1806. Bello also camped at Sokoto again in 1808, (Abubakar, 1979) <sup>[2]</sup>. The strategic and economic potentials of Sokoto was partly responsible for its location as the Headquarters of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1809, because;

Its position was strong; steep escarpments from the east to north-west and a small valley on the west and south-west protected it against surprise cavalry attacks. The town dominates the broad lowland where the two rivers, Rima and Sokoto meet, being the junction of roads from Gobir in the north, Kebbi in the south and Birnin Zamfara in the East, (Last 1966) <sup>[25]</sup>.

The fall of Alkalawa the capital of Gobir kingdom in 1808 also boost the population and significance of Sokoto in

1809. The population size of metropolitan Sokoto an area that includes; Danbara, Minanata, Rumjin Sambo, Gidan Igwa and Gidan Salihu among several others were 40,000 as estimated by Clapperton in 1824, (Clapperton 1824) <sup>[15]</sup>. Three years later it was approximated at 120,000 by Lender in 1827 (Lender, 1830) <sup>[27]</sup>. The figures seem flimsy and exaggerated.

What need to be said here is that metropolitan Sokoto was a major centre of attraction in the first decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It hosted large population who came for different purposes; trade, scholarship and other related occupations. The rapid expansion of the city was intensified with the relocation of *Sheikh* Usmanu bin Fodiyo from Sifawa to Sokoto in 1815. After this period deliberate policies were implemented to further expand the size and population of the area. Construction of *Ribats* towns, the settling of nomads, the active encouragement given to immigrants were measures which created a wide corridor of dense settlements and loyal populations around the city, (Abubakar, 1979) <sup>[2]</sup>.

With the advent of colonial rule Sokoto city became a provincial headquarters. The climate is hot for the greater part of the year, but becomes cooler during the months of December and March, when the Harmattan wind blows. The mean average temperatures are 94.2o F and 70.8o F. Mean annual rainfall is 38.7 inches. February and April are the hottest months. The coolest months are December and January. Vegetation varies in density with the rainfall. It is this vast territory that is here referred to as metropolitan Sokoto.

### Grains Trade during the Jihad

The Sokoto Jihad movement has been widely studied by scholars from different academic disciplines, (Last, 1967, Adeleye, 1971, Kani and Ghandi, 1990 and Usman, 1979) <sup>[2, 16, 1]</sup>. These scholars shades lights on the different dimensions of the movement. What needs to be reiterated here is that, the Jihad wars had serious economic consequences. Farming, rearing of animals and trade were interrupted due to the state of insecurity it created in the region (Alkali, 1969) <sup>[9]</sup>.

Grains production was severely affected in most areas where the Jihad was violently fought (Abubakar, 1979) <sup>[2]</sup>. During this period, most of the people that supposed to participate in grains production were either engaged in the war or deserted their farmlands for the fear of attacks from the warring groups. Moreover, it was the productive part of the population between the age brackets of 20 to 50 that were deeply involved in the war (Adeleye, 1971) <sup>[7]</sup>. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that most of the battles were fought during the raining season like the battle of Tafkin Kwatto June, 1804, battle of Birnin Kebbi, April, 1805 and battle of Yauri in August, 1806, (Adamu, 1990). According to Abubakar:

Food shortage was therefore acute; but the urgency and danger of the situation was re-emphasized by the prohibition of all trade with the emigrants, a ban so effective that grains couldn't be got even in distant towns (Abubakar, 1979) <sup>[2]</sup>.

Furthermore, severe drought also affected the whole region in 1804, which further complicated the food situation. At the apex of the Jihad most of the granaries were empty and

people looked on to the grain traders for the supply of food. Grains supply was restricted by high level of insecurity across the different trade routes, in fact not every trader could afford to take such expensive risk. The small number of traders that decided to make supply from other region to either the Jihadists or their antagonist did that at their own peril. Some of them were killed and their commodities confiscated by the opposing party.

Moreover, most of the markets where grains could be supplied were poorly attended because the trade routes were unsecured (Barth, 1857) <sup>[12]</sup>. Grains could not be adequately supplied from the major markets such as Alkalawa, Birnin Kebbi, Birnin Yawuri and Zurmi in the early period (Adamu, 1979). The problem was more severe from 1804 to 1805 when the *Jama'a* migrated from Degel to Gudu, an event that marked the formal declaration of the Jihad. These migrants were confronted with the problem of food scarcity because of the general food situation in the country and more importantly the way they hastily left their respective homes without any food arrangement (Balogun, 1971) <sup>[11]</sup>. This was part of the most pressing problem that confronted the Jihad leaders after the perpetual insurgence of the *Habe* rulers. Food scarcity was even more challenging than the war itself, because food must be urgently provided or else the vanguards of the revolution (*Jama'a*) would renounce their support for food and security from the *Habe* rulers (Hausa rulers) who were aggrieved by the movement, (Johnson, 1976) <sup>[21]</sup>. Burdon, the British Resident of Sokoto Province stated that 'the effect of the Jihad on Agriculture production was very obvious some major agricultural centres from Alkalawa to Argungu were deserted as a result of the disturbance (NAK/SNP/ Sokprof/575/1905). The sinister implication of this gross food scarcity was succinctly explained in the following words:

The rains of 1804 had already started but food supplies were still low. The local villagers were hostile and unwilling to sell grains; the Muslims cattle were inadequate to provide enough milk and would not usually be slaughter. With booty the only source of food, inevitably it was the peasant who suffered... The campaign terms: the search for food and, in addition for pasture and water for the cattle (Smith, 1955).

The *Habe* (Hausa) rulers were against grains supply to the Jihadists. Grain traders that supplied foods to the Jihad contingent were said to have committed 'treason', by the *Habe* rulers. This problem of food supply caused what Watts called 'military famine' in Sokoto metropolis that formed the main theatre of the revolution, (Watts, 1983) <sup>[39]</sup>. The end result of this was severe grains scarcity that adversely affected both the victor and vanquished. Food crisis had threatened the will and grip of the Jihad forces. While the *Habe* rulers and their supporters were determine to end the war so as to stabilise food supply in their respective areas. The food situation was gloomy during and immediately after the Jihad. The need to address the situation by the Jihad leaders was very apparent. Professional grain traders were expected to play an important role in this direction, because of their knowledge of the trade and areas of food sufficiency so that supply could be gotten with minimum delay. This informed the establishment of new institution that will not only ensure grain supply but also control and regulate the supply in

Sokoto metropolis.

### The Institution of *Muhtasib*

The word *Muhtasib*, is often interchangeably used with *Hisbah*. It is an Arabic word which originated from '*Ihtasaba*' and technically means promoting or ordering what is right and forbidding what is wrong (Muhatar n.d). The objective of this institution was to prohibit acts that are not in conformity with the *Shariah* (Islamic law) and also promote good virtues. The success or failure of an Islamic state is to a very large extent determined by the *Muhtasib* who played multiple functions in the defence of the state ideals (Abdulrahman, 1976) <sup>[5]</sup>. The office of *Muhtasib* was indeed not a new innovation. Its history could be traced back to the period of the Prophet Muhammad (S.A.W) who during his life time shouldered the responsibilities of *Muhtasib* by inspecting markets and regulating all economic transactions. This was with the view to limit the level of fraud, exploitation and hoarding of grains (Dogondaji, 2003). Later He appointed Sa'id Ibn Umayyah as the *Muhtasib* in the Makkan market and Umar Ibn al-Khattab in the Madinan market (Tambari, 2008) <sup>[38]</sup>. The fact that the Prophet (S.A.W) himself inspected and appointed inspectors to markets shows the possibility of violation of trade ethics by both traders and their customers in the market. This implies that if that was the case during the Prophet (S.A.W), then gross violation of the rule could also be expected in Sokoto.

As such the establishment of the institution was very apparent because most of the traders were not fully educated on the rules and regulations governing the conduct of trade in Islam. Moreover, some of the grain traders wanted to seize the opportunity of grains shortage to created by the Jihad to make huge profits. In the light of this the Caliphate created the office of the *Muhtasib* in 1812 with the view of providing sanity in economic transactions, (Aliyu 2000) <sup>[8]</sup>. It was strictly in line with the *Quranic* verse that says: *Let there be among you party whose business it should be to invite to goodness, to enjoin equity and forbid evil. It is they who shall prosper (Qur'an 3: V: 105)*

Muhammad Julde as one of the trusted followers of Sheikh Usmanu Dan Fodiyo was appointed as the first *Muhtasib*. Major precondition for his appointment was assets declaration, so as to set a good precedence for other office holders. The office was considered as one of the most influential offices and if appropriate person was not appointed to the office he may make a lot of illegal fortunes. Therefore, as law enforcement officer he must lead by example through assets declaration so that other office holders could follow suit (Bobboyi, 2011) <sup>[14]</sup>.

Muhammad Julde (1812-1855) however, served as *Muhtasib* for three Caliphs, from the period of Sheikh Usmanu Dan Fodiyo to Aliyu Babba the successor of Sheikh Muhammad Bello. After his retirement due to old age, he was succeeded by Muhammad Mustapha, (1858-1881). Next to him was *Muhtasib* Abdullahi (1881-1928), after his death he was succeeded by *Muhtasib* Ahmad 1928-1947, (Dogondaji, 1998) <sup>[16]</sup>.

### The role of *Muhtasib* in the Control of Grains Trade

One of the general economic functions of the *Muhtasib* was to ensure that production and distribution was done based on the principles of justice and equity as stated by the *Shari'ah*. This was a herculean task, because *Muhtasib* was expected

to be an expert in the regulation and control of inflation and deflation in the area. According to Shehu Usmanu bin Fodiyo, the *Muhtasib* has the following duties which

.. included seeing the judges made appointments for trying cases, so as not to keep everybody waiting; if a beast was ill-fed and the owner too poor, to provide food for the beast; if a farm was under tilled, and the owner unable to till it, to find a man to share the work and the crop; if a canoe was overloaded, to warn the owner twice before confiscating it (Quoted in Last, 1966).

Mallam Abdullahi bin Fodiyo d.1829 another leader of the Jihad subscribed to this view and added that the role of *Muhtasib*, was *to check on deficiencies in weights and measures, banishing hardened criminals from the markets and ensuring high standards in the production of food and crafts (Abdullahi 1815)*. Muhammadu Bello d. 1837 further stressed that the functions of the institution were categorized into three,

The *Muhtasib* is charged with the following duties. He is to stop any kind of cheating in weights and measures, any kind of deceit or misinformation on articles, trade or prices, and delay in the settlement of debts when the indebted person has the ability to settle the debt (Bello1820).

The specific duties of the *Muhtasib* were to ensure accuracy in the weight and measures of grains within and outside the market place (Bello 1820). He further maintained that the *Muhtasib* should check the weights and scales and whosoever persist on using wrong scale or measure should be punished and discharged from the market until he repents and reverts to justice (Bello, 1820). He also insisted that the *Muhtasib* should ensure one standard measure is used in the market, since the essence of scales and measures is to avoid cheating and exploitation in the market (Bello 1820). There should be constant checking and regulating the affairs of these traders. The essence of doing this was that the traders could not have the chance of cheating in the market.

Therefore, Sokoto metropolis under Muhammad Julde came out with a uniform weight and measure called *zakka* made from wood and calabash. There are of two types of *zakka* small and big, the small one is half of the big one. One big *Zakka* was enough to feed husband and wife with their few children in a day. Five of this *Zakka* makes a *garwa* of rice another measurement used in the measurement of rice (Sambo, 2013) <sup>[13]</sup>. The introduction of this standard measures had to a very large extent reduced the level of this irregularity in the market, the new measure was indeed better than the old one used by the traders. The *Zakka* according to my informant was created by the state and each carries the stamp of the *Muhtasib* which was very difficult to forge by the traders. This single action has created stability in the weights and measures. It is interesting to note that this measure is still in use in some places, (Sambo, 2013) <sup>[13]</sup>.

Moreover, he also regulates and controls grain prices in the market. The prices were fixed and constantly reviewed depending on the time and circumstances. The essence of this price control mechanism was to make sure that the economic interest of every citizen in the metropolis is protected, it was done in such a way that, the prices were

agreed upon by both the producer and consumer (Gusau, 1990). Further reason was that grain was very central to the economic life of the emerging metropolitan population and if such control measures were not in place the people were bound to suffer from the hands of market forces. The *Muhtasib* was mandated to reprimand and punish appropriately all those that attempt to sale their products over and above the acceptable market prices. Such people should be flogged and forced to leave the trade and market completely.

Similar punishment was ascribed to traders who blocked and purchased grains from farmers on their way to the market. The *Yan tarbe* as they were called in Hausa receives the attention of Shiekh Usmanu Fodio in his famous poem *Tabban Hakika* where he condemned this act and directed the *Muhtasib* to redouble efforts in checking this illegal market behaviour perpetuated by some traders (Abdulkadir, 1976) <sup>[36]</sup>. This was usually responsible for the increase in grain prices, because the commodity has gone through different brokers before it finally gets to the consumer at a high price, because some of these agents do not immediately take grains to the market rather keep till later in the evening when it was most needed. In this case it was sold due at exorbitant price. While others even take the grains to their stores or granaries for hoarding.

Grain hoarding was another area given special attention by the *Muhtasib*. Some traders and retailers developed the habit of excessive buying of grains during harvest, when the prices were exceptionally low, which was brought back to the markets, when it was dearly needed. In this case the *Muhtasib* was mandated to keep a watchful eye on this category of traders, they should be forced to stop it or else the grain confiscated and sold at acceptable market price. Shiekh Abdullahi bin Fodiyo made an appeal to this type of people according to him; O you grain traders beware of this act of the Godless... as well as hoarding of grains because they are all illegal, (Fodiyo, 1230). He further emphasised that grain traders and retailers that caused untold hardship in the society through hoarding and usury should be forced to stop it. In case there was noncompliance and other deviant activities the *Muhtasib* could take legal actions against them (Fodiyo, 1230).

Moreover, state granaries were constructed and left under the control of *Muhtasib*. He is to ensure that all grains collected from *Zakkat*, tributes and personal donations to the state were safely stored in the granaries. The major function of the granaries was to serve as a buffer to the people in the periods of droughts and famines. To avoid destruction by grain weevil it was expected that the granaries should be turned at regular intervals by the *Muhtasib*, (Gusau, 1992). Part of his responsibility in this respect was to ensure that the grains were distributed to the needy, the poor and the destitute evenly and accordingly. Also, grain loan should be given to people in need; both the collection and refunding of such grains must be supervised by the *Muhtasib*. He should also keep records related to these transactions and ensure prompt payments of all loans, (Gusau, 1992).

Another responsibility of the *Muhtasib* was to regulate import and export of grains. In case of excess grains production he should ensure that such excess were bought and taking to state granaries so as to avoid grains deflation, (Amin, 2002) <sup>[10]</sup>. This was in the spirit of justice to both producers and consumers of grains. The wisdom behind this was that whenever there was abundance of grains the price

will be affected and the traders would incur a lost. It is apparent because most farmers could not hold their grains beyond certain period of the year. Therefore the overall objective was to ensure that there was neither shortage nor excess of grains in the markets, (Tambari, 2008) <sup>[38]</sup>.

Furthermore, in an attempt to regulate import and export of grains the *Muhtasib* should be mindful of the trade routes that linked various commercial centres together. He must stationed guards along the routes that could provide maximum security of lives and properties of the traders. Any complain from the trade routes should be directed to him so as to address the issues adequately, the *Muhtasib* was to carry out this responsibility in conjunction with the various Emirs in the emirates (Dogondaji, 1998) <sup>[16]</sup>. The reason was simply for them (Emirs) to provide vital information on the issues of demand and supply of grains in their respective emirates. The safety of the traders, accommodation and other basic requirements that could make their stay in the area lively were under the control of the *Muhtasib*. In line with this provision, *Muhtasib* Muhammadu Mustapha built lodging houses for long distance traders in Sokoto in 1874, the house was meant to provide free accommodation and feeding to all long distance traders, while they are in the lodge, such traders should be connected with indigenou middle men who would lead them to the markets for the purchase of goods. In fact the traders were considered royal visitors *Bakin Sarki* who ought to be treated with high level of hospitality, (Dogondaji, 1998) <sup>[16]</sup>.

The *Muhtasib* was further vested with the responsibility of ensuring regular supply of grains to different parts of the metropolis. To further simplify this function, *Muhtasib* Muhammadu julde divided the metropolis in to different agricultural zones for easy distribution of grains. For instance some areas like Western Sokoto produced more rice than the eastern part that produced more millet, guinea corn and bulrush millet. Therefore, the division was to ensure easy movement of excess grains to areas that were in need of it without causing any difficulty to both farmers and traders in the region, (Lawal, 1990) <sup>[33]</sup>. This institution played an important role in the stability and regulation of the trade during the period 1812-1903.

## Conclusion

On the whole it needs to be stressed that Sokoto Caliphate designed and implemented policies that had direct bearing on grains trade. The policies to a very large extent ensured not only availability of grains in the markets but also provided a guiding principle to traders, which in turn reduced the level of market imperfection of hoarding and usury on the part of the traders. The success recorded in this direction was associated with the high level of dedication and commitment shown by *Muhtasib*, an institution that regulated, controlled and guided the conduct of grains trade. He was also charged with the responsibilities of providing security to grain traders along the trade routes. The emphasis given by the Caliphate on grains trade was partly associated with the influx of migrants from different parts of Hausaland in to the metropolitan centre of Sokoto. Most of this people came at the early period in the emergence of Sokoto town. Food scarcity was amongst the fundamental challenges that confronted the Jihad leaders in the formative years. The appointment of the *Muhtasib* went a long way in reducing the problem of food scarcity and market

imperfection in Sokoto metropolis. A cursory reflection on the food situation in present Sokoto metropolis shows a lot of issues and challenges associated with the nonchalant attitude of the government towards the nature and operation of grain trade. There is neither standardisation of weight and measures nor clear laws guiding the conduct of the trade. This has impacted negatively on the operation of grains trade creation room for hoarding, usury and undue profit and the expense of the consumers. Therefore, the paper called for not only controlling and regulating the trade but strong and committed institution like that of the *Muhtasib* should be reconstituted so as to ensure abundant food supply and market free from irregularities.

## References

1. Abba Y. The 1804 Jihad in Hausaland as a Revolution' In Usman, Y.B. Studies in the History of the Sokoto Caliphate, Department of History ABU Zaria, 1979.
2. Abubakar S. Aspect of an Urban Phenomenon: Sokoto and its Hinterland to c.1851' In Usman, Y.B Studies in the History of Sokoto Caliphate, Department of History, ABU Zaria, 1979, 124-137.
3. Abdullahi F. al-Wilayat fi 'l-umur al -dunyawiyya wa'l-diniyyat', 26 Dhul' I Qada 1230/30 October, 1815, ALA II,94, 1815, 8.
4. al-Wilayat fi 'l-umur al -dunyawiyya wa'l-diniyyat', 26 Dhul' I Qada 1230/30
5. Abdulrahman M. The Classical Caliphate, Islamic Foundations, Islamic Publication Bureau Lagos, Abubakar, S.1979 ' Aspects of an Urban Phenomenon: Sokoto and its Hinterland to c.1850' In Y.B.Usman, Studies in the History of Sokoto Caliphate, Department of History, ABU Zaria, 1976.
6. Adamu M. Distribution of Trading Centres in the Central Sudan in the Eighteen and Nineteenth Centuries' In Y.B. Usman, Studies in the History of Sokoto Caliphate, Department of History, ABU Zaria, 1976.
7. Adeleye RA. Power and Diplomacy in Northern Nigeria 1804-1906, University of Ibadan, Longman, 1971.
8. Aliyu C. An Analysis of the Views of Shaykh Abdullahi Fodiyo on Economic Development, Ph.D, 2000.
9. Alkali MB. Hausa Community in Crisis Kebbi in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, M.A. Dissertation, A.B.U. Zaria, 1969.
10. Amin AB. Development of the Institution of *Hisbah* and its Relation with Khalif' Hamdard Islamicus. 2002, 4.
11. Balogun SA. Gwandu Emirates in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century with Special Reference to Political Relations, Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Ibadan, 1971.
12. Barth H. Travels and Discoveries in North and Central Africa: being a Journal of an Expedition undertaken under the auspices of H.M.B's. Government, in the year, 1857, 1849-1855, Vol 5, London, Vol.1
13. Bello M. Infakul-Maisuri, Translated and Edited by E J., Annett, 1922.
14. Bobboyi H. Principles of Leadership: According to the founding fathers of the Sokoto Caliphate, CRID, Kano, 2011.
15. Clapperton H. Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, London, 1928.
16. Dogondaji SD. 'Economic Regulation in the History of Economic Thought: A study of Prominent Scholars in the Sokoto Caliphate', MSC Dissertation, Department of Economics, UDUS, 1998.
17. The Institution of Hisbah during the Islamic Classical period, the predecessors of the Holy Prophet and the four Rightly Caliphs', benign a paper presented at Departmental Seminar, Department of Economics, Usmanu Danfodiyo University Sokoto, 2003.
18. Gusau SA. Aspects of Islamic Economy in Sokoto Caliphate' In Kani A.M and Gandi, K.A State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1990, 171-179.
19. Islam and Contemporary Economic Problems' Unpublished Paper, 1992.
20. Isa UI. Metropolitan Sokoto: Issues in History and Urban Development since 1960, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 2013.
21. Johnson HA. The Fulani Empire of Sokoto, Oxford University Press, 1976.
22. Jumare IM. Land Tenure in the Sokoto Sultanate of Nigeria, Ph.D Thesis, York University Canada, 1995.
23. Kani AM. The Intellectual Origin of the Sokoto Jihad, Iman Publication; Ibadan, Nigeria, (1405AH), 1985.
24. Kani AM, Gandi KA. State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate, Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1990.
25. Last MD. An Aspect of the Caliph Muhammad Bello's Social Policy' In Kano Studies, No.2. Abdullahi Bayero Collage, ABU Zaria, J, 1966.
26. The Sokoto Caliphate, London, Longman, 1967, 24.
27. Lender R. Journal of an Expedition to Explore the Source and Termination of the, 1930.
28. Muhammad B. Tanbih al-sahib'ala ahkam al-makasib, 1820, 1253/13 June 1820, ALA II,98
29. 1820. al-Ghayt al-Wabi fi sirag al-Imam al-Adl, 1236/1820-21, ALA II, 117-8.
30. Mukhtar H. Public Duties in Islam, Islamic Foundation, n.d., 48.
31. NAK/SNP/ SOKProf./575/1905: Report No.26 on Sokoto Province for the Months of July and August 1905 by I.A.Burdon.
32. Qur'an 3: V:105.
33. Lawal SA. The Political Economy of the State in the Sokoto Caliphate' In Kani M.A and Gandi, K.A. State and Society in the Sokoto Caliphate, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 1990.
34. Sambo W. Oral Interview 75years, Monday, 11<sup>th</sup> February, 2013.
35. Shehu Usman. Siraj al-Ikhwan, 1812/1227 (Kani trans) chapter, 1812.
36. Tabban Hakikan' in Dandatti Abdulkadir(ed) Zababbun Wakokin Da da na Yanzu, Nigeria, Nelson, 1976.
37. Smith MG. The Economy of Hausa Communities of Zaria, HMSO, Colonial Research Studies, 1955, 16.
38. Tambari AB. The Role of Hisbah in Promoting Ethical Values in the Muslim Society: A Case Study of Sokoto State, M.A. Dissertation, Department of Islamic Studies, UDUS, Usman, Y.B 1976. Studies in the History of Sokoto Caliphate, Department of History, ABU Zaria, 2008.
39. Watts W. Salient Violence, Food, Famine and Peasantry in Northern Nigeria, University of California, 1983.